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SUBJECT: SUDAN AND THE ARABS: POSSIBLY STEP-SISTERS;
CERTAINLY NOT BROTHERS

¶11. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

¶12. SUMMARY: SUDAN'S ARAB RELATIONSHIPS HAVE UNDERGONE A METAMORPHOSIS SINCE THE MILITARY COUP OF JUNE 1989. MOST ARAB STATES REACTED WARMLY TO THE OUSTER OF SADIO AL-MAHDI. SINCE THEN, THIS WARMTH HAS DISSIPATED AS AN UNENLIGHTENED GOS HAS DRIFTED TOWARD LIBYA FOR SUSTENANCE. THE GOS HAS TRIED TO GLOSS OVER ITS PECULIAR INTEGRATION PLAN WITH LIBYA BY DEPICTING IT AS A STEP TOWARD ARAB UNITY. WHILE SOUTHERN SUDANESE BLAME ARAB INFLUENCE FOR THEIR TROUBLES, SUDAN'S ARAB IMPULSES REFLECT EXPEDIENCY MORE THAN CONVICTION. OTHER THAN HISTORICAL, MULTIFACETED LINKAGES WITH EGYPT, SUDAN'S ARAB TIES ARE LARGEY DRIVEN BY PROSPECTS OF JOBS AND AID, ESPECIALLY DONATION OF KEY COMMODITIES (WHEAT AND OIL) AND MILITARY MATERIAL. THE RELATIONSHIPS TEND TO BE ONE-SIDED--SUDAN IS A WILLING RECIPIENT WITH LITTLE, EXCEPT RHETORIC AND ITS SOVEREIGNTY IN THE CASE OF LIBYA, TO OFFER. AMONG ARABS, EGYPT IS MOST MINDFUL OF SUDAN WITH CONCERN FOR WATER RESOURCES AND STABILITY. SUDANESE ARE DRAWN TO EGYPT--AS MANY AS A MILLION MAY LIVE THERE--AND RELY ON ITS BENEFICIENCE BUT ARE QUICK TO BRIDLE AT PERCEIVED MEDDLING. PRIME TARGETS FOR GOS SOLICITATIONS ARE LIBYA (RECEPTIVE), IRAQ (ONCE RECEPTIVE) AND SAUDI ARABIA (DISENCHANTED). MEANWHILE LARGE SUDANESE COMMUNITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND THE UAE REMAIN KEY SOURCES FOR PRIVATE INCOME AND BADLY NEEDED BUT DECLINING INVESTMENT. END SUMMARY.

OVERVIEW

¶13. SUDAN, WITH ITS ETHNIC AMALGAM STRETCHING SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, DOES NOT FIT COMFORTABLY INTO THE ARAB WORLD. TO BE SURE, ARAB CULTURE--LANGUAGE, MEDIA, THE ARTS, HISTORY, MANNERS--PERMEATES NORTHERN SUDANESE THINKING AND BEHAVIOR, AND ITS INFLUENCE IS EVIDENT EVEN AMONG SOUTHERNERS PRONE TO RESIST IT. MOREOVER, SUDAN'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY INSTITUTIONS ARE DOMINATED BY MEMBERS OF RIVERINE, EASTERN AND WESTERN TRIBES CONVENTIONALLY CLASSIFIED AS ARAB. AS POLITICS GO, HOWEVER, THIS ARABIST LINK, INTRODUCED BY THE EGYPTIANS, IS IN MANY WAYS AN ARTIFICIAL CONCEPTION. SUDANESE, EMBROILED IN THEIR OWN NATIONAL AND PERSONAL PROBLEMS, ARE NOT EMOTIONALLY DRIVEN BY "ARAB ISSUES" LIKE THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT AND THE IRANIAN THREAT, EXCEPT AS THEY BEAR A MORE DIRECT RELATIONSHIP, E.G. ISRAEL'S ETHIOPIAN TIES AND ITS ALLEGED LINKS WITH THE SPLA. RELIGIOUS AND RACIAL FACTORS--THE HISTORIC STAIN OF THE ARAB SLAVE TRADE, INSTANCES OF DISCRIMINATION, AND PERCEPTIONS OF ISLAMIC NONCONFORMITY--ALSO DISTANCE SUDANESE SOMEWHAT FROM THE ARAB MAINSTREAM.

¶14. NOTWITHSTANDING AMBIVALENT EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENT TO THE OFFICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, PARTICIPATES IN THE INNUMERABLE ARAB GATHERINGS AND HIGHLIGHTS ITS ARAB CREDENTIALS WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO THE EXTENT OF UNDERTAKING AIRY UNITY PROJECTS. THE REASON IS PLAINLY SELF-INTEREST. SUDAN EMBRACES ARABISM BECAUSE IT LITERALLY PAYS TO DO SO. SUFFERING FROM AN INTERMINABLE WAR AND ECONOMIC DEVASTATION, SUDAN NEEDS THE JOB AND AID OPPORTUNITIES THAT ARAB COUNTRIES CAN AND SOMETIMES DO PROVIDE.

¶ 15. WHILE NORTHERN SUDANESE TEND TO ACCEPT THEIR ARAB STATUS AS USEFUL, SOUTHERNERS PERCEIVE ARABS AS THE PROBLEM. TO SOUTHERNERS, "ARAB" HAS BECOME A PEJORATIVE TERM REPRESENTING UNJUST AND OPPRESSIVE BEHAVIOR. PASSING OVER SUDAN'S ETHNIC DIVERSITY, TRADITIONAL RIVALRIES AND IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS, THEY ARE FOND OF BLAMING THE ARABS FOR MISRULE AND INEQUITY. A FREQUENT SOUTHERN REFRAIN IS THAT ARABS CONSTITUTE ONLY A MINORITY, THOUGH A PLURALITY, IN SUDAN, WHICH IS PROBABLY TRUE. BASED ON THIS ASSUMPTION, SOUTHERNERS ARGUE THAT THEIR UNITING WITH NONARAB NORTHERNERS--SUCH AS THE NUBA, THE FUR, AND THE NUBIANS--COULD RESOLVE SUDAN'S DIVISIVE PROBLEMS. THE IMPROBABILITY OF THIS THESIS ONLY UNDERSCORES ITS FALLACY. RELIGIOUS, IDEOLOGICAL AND TRADITIONAL TRIBAL DIVISIONS OUTWEIGH THE ISSUE OF ARAB TIES. THE FUR OF DARFUR, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE MORE AT EASE WITH ARAB MUSLIMS, EXCEPTING PERHAPS THEIR RIZEIGAT ADVERSARIES, THAN WITH SOUTHERN CHRISTIANS.

¶ 16. THE ARAB WORLD, FOR THE MOST PART, LOOKS ON SUDAN AS CHRONICALLY WAYWARD WITH SELF-INDUCED PROBLEMS. SUDANESE ARE VIEWED AS PERSONABLE, RESPECTFUL OF AUTHORITY, AND DEPENDABLE WORKERS ABROAD BUT, AT HOME, HOPELESSLY INCAPABLE OF MANAGING THEMSELVES. EXASPERATION AND PATERNALISM ARE STANDARD ARAB RESPONSES. BROODING ABOUT BURDENOME AND UNSAFE (THE UAE AMBASSADOR WAS NEARLY ASSASSINATED IN 1988) LIVING CONDITIONS, ARAB DIPLOMATS IN KHARTOUM UNIFORMLY CRAVE EARLY REASSIGNMENTS. THEIR AVOIDANCE OF THE WESTERN DIPLOMATIC CIRCUIT (EXCEPTING EGYPT ABD MOROCCO) IS NOT NECESSARILY INDICATIVE OF THEIR INDUSTRY, THOUGH SOME ARE NOTICEABLY UNINFORMED AND UNPRODUCTIVE. THE EGYPTIANS ARE THE MOST NUMBEROUS, ACTIVE, VISIBLE AND BEST INFORMED OF ARAB DIPLOMATS. DIPLOMATS FROM WEALTHIER ARAB STATES ALSO SOCIALIZE REGULARLY WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. HOWEVER, THEY ARE USUALLY ASKED FOR MORE ASSISTANCE THAN ADVICE.

¶ 17. TWO AXIOMS WELL DEFINE THE STATE OF SUDAN'S ARAB RELATIONS TODAY. FIRST, A SENSE OF DEJA VU PREVAILS. IRRESOLUTE DECISIONMAKING AND ZIGZAGGING POLICIES CHARACTERIZING SADIQ AL-MAHDI'S GOVERNMENTS HAS ALSO PLAGUED THEIR MILITARY SUCCESSOR PUSHING SUDAN TOWARD INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION AND IRRELEVANCE. SADIQ'S OUSTER IN JUNE 1989 WAS WELCOMED HEARTILY BY MOST ARABS. THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER'S INCOMPETENT RULE, TACTLESS CONDUCT AND FLIRTATIONS WITH THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT (NIF) AND IRAN MANAGED TO ANTAGONIZE PRACTICALLY ALL ARABS SAVE LIBYA. THESE EARLY CHEERS SOURED HOWEVER AS THE RCC RAPIDLY REVEALED THEIR OWN BRAND OF ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT, INABILITY TO COMPROMISE FOR PEACE AND A POLITICAL AGENDA WHICH IS ATTRACTIVE TO ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS. THE REGIME WHICH BEGAN BY COLD SHOULDERING THE LIBYANS AND MAKING OVERTURES TO MODERATE ARABS GRADUALLY REVERTED, BECAUSE OF NECESSITY, TO WHERE SUDAN'S WARMEST PUBLIC RELATIONSHIP IS AGAIN THAT WITH LIBYA.

¶ 18. SECOND, SUDAN'S ARAB RELATIONSHIPS, LARGELY UNILATERAL IN TERMS OF TANGIBLE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY BENEFITS, CLEARLY ARE MORE IMPORTANT TO SUDAN THAN TO ITS PARTNERS. A HIERARCHY EXISTS AMONG THESE RELATIONSHIPS. ON THE PERIPHERY, WITH MINIMAL TIES TO SUDAN, ARE THE MAHGREG STATES (MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA), PEOPLES OF THE LEVANT (LEBANESE, SYRIANS, PALESTINIANS, JORDANIANS) AND OTHER NONDONOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES (SOMALIA, DJIBOUTI, MAURITANIA). OF GREATER IMPORTANCE ARE THE SMALL ARABIAN PENINSULAR STATES WHERE MANY SUDANESE WORK. MORE VITAL ARE SAUDI ARABIA, LIBYA AND IRAQ WHICH ARE PRIME TARGETS FOR AID AND EMPLOYMENT. FINALLY, EGYPT IS IN A CATEGORY OF ITS OWN. A BRIEF SURVEY OF SOME OF THESE RELATIONSHIPS FOLLOWS.

EGYPT

¶ 19. SUDAN HAS LONG MAINTAINED A SUBSTANTIAL (THOUGH OCCASIONALLY PRICKLY) RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT THAT IS FIRMLY FOUNDED ON HISTORY AND THE NILE. COMBINED WITHIN

OTTOMAN EGYPT AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM (AND EVEN EARLIER DATING BACK TO CUSHITE PHARAOHS), SUDANESE AND EGYPTIANS REFER TO THEMSELVES AS BROTHERS. BY ITS VERY FAMILIARITY AND OBVIOUS ASYMMETRY, THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP UNDERGOES PERIODIC STRAINS. MUTUAL INTERESTS AND PERSONAL CONTACTS SO TIGHTLY INTERTWINE THIS LINK, HOWEVER, THAT A RUPTURE IS ALL BUT IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE.

¶10. THE EGYPTIAN-SUDANESE RELATIONSHIP IS FAR DEEPER AND MORE MULTI-FACETED THAN MANY REALIZE. EGYPT'S PRIMARY CONCERN IS STABILITY ON ITS SOUTHERN BORDER AND ENSURING ITS WATER SUPPLY. MEASUREMENT OF NILE WATERS IS AN IMPORTANT FUNCTION OF EGYPTIAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS. SUDAN, EGYPT AND ETHIOPIA FREQUENTLY DEBATE WATER ALLOCATIONS IN BILATERAL SESSIONS AND IN FORMAL MEETINGS OF A NILE WATER COMMISSION. (SUDAN REPORTEDLY USES ONLY ONE QUARTER OF ITS ALLOCATION WHILE EGYPT USES TWICE ITS ALLOCATED AMOUNT.) ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST SUCCESSES IN SUDAN THAT COULD STIMULATE EGYPT'S RELIGIOUS RIGHT WORRY THE EGYPTIANS ABOVE OTHER POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. THERE IS NOT, HOWEVER, A STRONG LINK BETWEEN THE NIF AND EGYPT'S MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND ASSORTED ISLAMIC GAMAA GROUPINGS. EGYPTIAN-SUDANESE TIES IN GENERAL ARE SUSTAINED THROUGH A VARIETY OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONNECTIONS. AMONG THEM: A STEADY STREAM OF SUDANESE SHOPPERS, VACATIONERS AND JOB-SEEKERS TRAVELLING TO EGYPT (UP TO A MILLION ARE BELIEVED TO LIVE THERE); AN OPTIONAL EGYPTIAN SCHOOL SYSTEM, ELEMENTARY THROUGH UNIVERSITY, IN SUDAN FUNDED BY THE GOE; THE PERVERSIVE INFLUENCE OF EGYPTIAN MEDIA AND POPULAR CULTURE IN SUDAN; AN ESTIMATED 20,000 SUDANESE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN EGYPT (INCLUDING 1000 SOUTHERNERS ON EGYPTIAN SCHOLARSHIPS); STRONG COMMERCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS; EGYPTIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY IN AGRICULTURE; EGYPTIAN TRAINING FOR POLICE, MILITARY OFFICERS AND TRADE UNIONISTS; AND A HERITAGE OF EGYPTIAN-SUDANESE MARRIAGES (SADAT'S MOTHER WAS SUDANESE; AHMAD AL-MIRGHANI AND MUBARAK AL-MAHDI'S MOTHERS ARE EGYPTIAN).

¶11. DESPITE THEIR CLOSE RELATIONS, EGYPTIANS ADMIT TO BEING CONSTANTLY CONFOUNDED BY THEIR UNPREDICTABLE SOUTHERN BROTHERS. SHOCKED IN THE 1950'S WHEN SUDAN ON SHORT NOTICE AND IN A REVERSAL OF POLICY OPTED FOR INDEPENDENCE RATHER THAN UNION, THE EGYPTIANS HAVE SINCE TRIED, OFTEN UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO GUIDE SUDANESE POLICIES WITHOUT SEEMING OVERBEARING. MANY EGYPTIANS PRIVATELY ADMIT TO VIEWING SUDANESE AS INTELLECTUALLY INFERIOR. BUT THEY RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO DEAL CAREFULLY WITH SUDANESE WHO ARE HYPERSENSITIVE TO PERCEIVED EGYPTIAN INSULTS TO THEIR DIGNITY.

¶12. BY CONTRAST, MOST SUDANESE ARE CYNICAL AND DUBIOUS ABOUT EGYPTIAN MOTIVES. MANY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT DISCARDED PLANS TO UNITE WITH AND CONTROL SUDAN. (ONLY A FEW SUDANESE DINOSAURS BELONGING TO THE OLD NATIONAL UNIONIST PARTY STILL SUPPORT THIS ONCE POPULAR DREAM.) THE BUILDING OF THE ASWAN DAM, WHICH FORCED THE RELOCATION OF NORTHERN SUDANESE RESIDENTS OF WADI HALFA, AND THE UNCOMPLETED JONGOLAI CANAL, BELIEVED BY SOUTHERNERS TO BE AN EGYPTIAN PLOT TO DIVERT NILE WATERS FOR ITS BENEFIT, STILL AROUSES RESENTMENT. THEY COMPLAIN ABOUT THE UBIQUITOUS EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. IN EXPLAINING THEIR ATTITUDES, SUDANESE WILL OFTEN DRAW DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SUDANESE AND EGYPTIAN PERSONALITY AND CHARACTER TRAITS. EGYPTIANS COMMONLY ARE SAID TO BE CAREFREE, HUMOROUS, DECEPTIVE AND MACHIEVILLIAN, AND COMFORTABLE WITH AUTHORITARIAN RULE WHILE THE SUDANESE DESCRIBE THEMSELVES AS SERIOUS, INTROVERTED, HONEST, DIRECT AND POLITICALLY LIBERTARIAN.

¶13. SUDANESE WILL USUALLY SAY THAT EGYPTIANS EVOKE BITTERSWEET FEELINGS. MOST SUDANESE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY FEEL COMFORTABLE WITH EGYPTIANS AND THAT EGYPT IS THEIR MOST INTIMATE AND IMPORTANT NEIGHBOR. ON PRACTICALLY ANY POLITICAL ISSUE--E.G. AN ALTERNATIVE TO SHARIA, LIBYAN INTEGRATION, HANGING OF CURRENCY VIOLATORS--THE FIRST SUDANESE REACTION IS TO WONDER ABOUT

EGYPT'S REACTION. DEEP DOWN, SUDANESE, EVEN MOST UMMA PARTY ADHERENTS, ADMIT TO THE EXPECTATION, IF NOT APPRECIATION, OF EGYPTIAN GUIDANCE AND PROTECTION. AT THE SAME TIME, REFLECTING THE CLASSIC LOVE/HATE EMOTIONS OF A SUBORDINATE TOWARD HIS MORE POWERFUL GUARDIAN, SUDANESE ENJOY NOTHING BETTER THAN TO BAIT EGYPTIANS AND WATCH THEM PUBLICLY HUMILIATED. A DISPUTED FOUL IN A FOOTBALL MATCH IN KHARTOUM BETWEEN SUDAN AND EGYPT ALMOST STARTED A RIOT IN EARLY 1989. MOST SUDANESE ENTHUSIASTICALLY CHEERED FOR ALGERIA (AS THEY WILL FOR ANY OPPONENT OF EGYPT) IN ALGERIA'S RECENT WORLD CUP MATCHES WITH EGYPT.

¶14. THE RESULT OF THE JUNE 30 COUP WAS A SURPRISE TO THE EGYPTIANS THOUGH, AT THE TIME, THE GOE CERTAINLY WELCOMED AND ENCOURAGED CHANGE MORE THAN ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT, AS A RESULT OF ITS ROCKY RELATIONSHIP WITH SADIQ AL-MAHDI AND HIS EGYPTOPHOBIC UMMA COLLEAGUES. GENERAL OMAR HIGHLIGHTED THE SHIFT IN POLICY BY INVITING EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR SHERBINI FOR DISCUSSIONS SOON AFTER THE COUP AND MAKING CAIRO HIS FIRST FOREIGN CALL (IN CONTRAST TO SADIQ WHO DELIBERATELY SNUBBED EGYPT AND TRAVELED WIDELY BEFORE VISITING EGYPT.) WITH UNAPOLOGETIC DECLARATIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOE, THE RCC SOLICITED ADVICE OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND AMBASSADOR SHERBINI. THE BLANDISHMENTS AND THE POLITICAL TURNAROUND IN THE GOS POSTURE TOWARD EGYPT HAD THEIR DESIRED EFFECT, WITH THE GOE SENDING EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND ENCOURAGING DONATIONS FROM ITS WEALTHIER MODERATE ARAB FRIENDS. MUBARAK AND THE EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (TRADITIONAL LEADING PLAYERS INVOLVING SUDAN) CLEARLY WANTED TO BELIEVE IN GENERAL OMAR. MOUNTING EVIDENCE OF FUNDAMENTALIST LEANINGS, UNPOPULARITY, AND INCOMPETENCY WERE DISCOUNTED, EVENTUALLY LEADING IN LATE 1989 TO AN EGYPTIAN SPLIT IN PERCEPTIONS OF SUDAN BETWEEN SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS AND A LESS SANGUINE FOREIGN MINISTRY. THIS SPLIT QUICKLY BECAME A HOT TOPIC OF SUDANESE POLITICAL CONVERSATION. WHILE BIFURCATED GOE VIEWS OF SUDAN APPARENTLY REMAIN, SUDANESE ARGUE THAT GOE DISCONTENT WITH EVENTS IN SUDAN HAVE WIDENED AND DEEPENED AS THE GOS HAS WARMED TO LIBYA AND FAILED TO MAKE PEACE WITH THE SPLA. MOST BELIEVE THAT THE GOE HAS RETREATED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM ITS EARLY SUPPORT OF THE RCC AND THAT FROSTIER BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND EVEN COUP PLOTTING, REMINISCENT OF A YEAR AGO ARE IN THE OFFING.

¶15. ALTHOUGH SUDANESE SHOP FOR CONSUMER GOODS IN CAIRO AND MOST LOCAL MERCHANTS (INCLUDING MANY COPTS) MAINTAIN TIES TO EGYPTIAN COMPANIES, EGYPT IS NOT SUDAN'S TOP TRADING PARTNER. OFFICIAL TRADE HAS BEEN GOVERNED BY SPECIAL TRADE PROTOCOLS THAT PROVIDES BARTER AND SPECIAL ACCOUNTING MECHANISMS TO DEAL WITH THE NONCONVERTIBLE CURRENCIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. THESE PROTOCOLS, LARGELY ILLUSORY (TRADE GOES ON REGARDLESS) WITH FANCIFUL PROJECTED AMOUNTS--USDOLS 360 MILLION IN THE 1989 PROTOCOL--AND AN OVERVALUED SUDANESE POUND IN RELATION TO THE EGYPTIAN POUND, HAVE BROKEN DOWN REGULARLY WITH MUTUAL CHARGES OF AN UNFAIR SURPLUS AND FAILURE TO LIVE UP TO THE ACCORD. IN 1989, THE GOVERNMENT OF SADIQ AL-MAHDI ABROGATED THE PROTOCOL AND RESORTED BRIEFLY TO TIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE AND BORDER TRAFFIC (NUBIANS IN NORTHERN SUDAN TRADITIONALLY HAVE FLOATED BETWEEN BORDERS). WITH FRIENDLIER BILATERAL TIES AFTER THE COUP, ANOTHER LUCRATIVE PROTOCOL WAS NEGOTIATED. KEY PROBLEMS WITH THE PROTOCOLS HAVE BEEN SMUGGLING, ESPECIALLY OF SUDANESE CAMELS BYPASSING EGYPTIAN CUSTOMS OFFICIALS, AND A COMPLICATED MULTIPLE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME THAT DIFFERS ACCORDING TO VARIOUS COMMODITIES. ACCORDING TO THE LATEST STATISTICS, SUDAN EXPORTED 26,607,000 SUDANESE POUNDS (USDOLS 2,216,000 BASED ON CURRENT COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE RATE) WORTH OF GOODS TO EGYPT IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1989--PRIMARILY SESAME, WATERMELON SEEDS AND CAMELS. CAMELS CONSTITUTE THE BULK OF EXPORTS. (THE 1989 PROTOCOL ASSIGNED A VALUE OF USDOLS 120 MILLION FOR CAMEL EXPORTS; LITTLE OF THE CAMEL TRADE FLOWS THROUGH OFFICIAL CHANNELS.) DURING THE SAME PERIOD, IMPORTS FROM EGYPT TOTALLED 113,081,000 SUDANESE POUNDS (USDOLS 9,423,000), CONCENTRATED IN TEXTILES AND OTHER MANUFACTURED GOODS.

THE TEMPORARY RUPTURE IN THE PROTOCOL FAILED TO PUT A DENT INTO TRADE PATTERNS. TOTAL OFFICIAL EGYPTIAN TRADE (IMPORTS AND EXPORTS) FOR ALL OF 1988 AMOUNTED TO 161 MILLION POUNDS.

¶16. PLEADING POVERTY AND A NEED TO APPEAR EVENHANDED IN SUDAN'S CIVIL WAR, EGYPT HAS PROVIDED LITTLE MILITARY ASSISTANCE, MUCH TO THE SUDANESE ARMY'S CHAGRIN. A MILITARY AGREEMENT EXISTS BETWEEN SUDAN AND EGYPT. A DEFENSE TREATY SIGNED BY NIMEIRI WAS TRANSFORMED INTO A WEAK "BROTHERHOOD CHARTER" UNDER SADIQ AL-MAHDI. EVEN THIS WAS REPEALED IN 1989 AT THE INSISTENCE OF THE SPLA. AFTER THE COUP HOWEVER, THE GOS ANNOUNCED THAT THE MILITARY DEFENSE TREATY HAD NEVER BEEN ABROGATED AND THUS REMAINED IN EFFECT. THE GOE, INDIFFERENT TO WHETHER A TREATY EXISTS OR NOT, HAS SHOWN RELATIVELY LITTLE INTEREST IN THE WHOLE AFFAIR. EGYPT'S BIGGEST INFLUENCE WITH THE SUDANESE MILITARY HAS BEEN THROUGH ITS TRAINING PROGRAMS, RANGING FROM BASIC LEVELS TO NASSER HIGHER WAR COLLEGE. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL (RCC) RECEIVED TRAINING IN EGYPT, WHICH REMAINS SUDAN'S CENTER OF FOREIGN MILITARY TRAINING. MOST SUDANESE OFFICERS ARE SYMPATHETIC TO EGYPTIANS, THOUGH THEY CHAFE AT THE LACK OF MATERIAL HELP. SMALL AMOUNTS OF MILITARY AID RECENTLY PROVIDED HAVE BEEN NONLETHAL SUCH AS UNIFORMS AND PARACHUTES. SUDANESE ARE QUICK TO REMIND THE EGYPTIANS THAT SUDANESE BRIGADES FOUGHT SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE EGYPTIANS DURING ALL THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS.

LIBYA

¶17. AN INTEGRATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN SUDAN AND LIBYA ABRUPTLY ANNOUNCED IN EARLY MARCH 1990 PROPOSING TO COMBINE THE TWO COUNTRIES' POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS WITHIN FOUR YEARS CULMINATED A STEADY WARMING TREND IN THE RCC'S RELATIONSHIP WITH TRIPOLI. A RECURRING PHENOMENON TO LURE COLONEL QADHAFI'S FAVOR, THE UNITY PACKAGE LARGELY REGURGITATED OLD IDEAS INCORPORATED MOST RECENTLY IN AN ABORTED UNITY PLAN MOOTED IN 1988. DESPITE ORNATE RHETORIC, MULTIPLE OFFICIAL VISITS, AND A CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO PROMOTING UNITY, FEW SUDANESE SERIOUSLY BELIEVE IT WILL SUCCEED. THUS, CONFIDENT THAT UNITY WILL UNGLUE BEFORE IT MATERIALIZES, PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO INTEGRATION IS LIMITED, THOUGH SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS REPORTEDLY HAVE VOICED DISSATISFACTION. RIDICULE IS THE MORE COMMON REACTION. AWARE OF THE DERISION, THE GOS HAS TRIED TO PORTRAY THE ACCORD AS A STEP TOWARD PAN-ARAB UNITY, A MORE PALATABLE IF EquALLY UNLIKELY NOTION. THE UNITY SCHEME, SO LONG AS IT IS UNREALIZED ALSO HAS ITS SUPPORTERS. MANY SUDANESE ACCEPT LIBYAN AID AS AN ABSOLUTE NECESSITY AND WELL WORTH HOLLOW RHETORIC AND QUIXOTIC UNITY SCHEMES. SUDANESE MOSTLY LOOK UPON LIBYANS AS DUUNDERHEADS AND QADHAFI AS ECCENTRIC BUT NOT A REAL THREAT TO SUDAN. "MILK THEM WHILE YOU CAN" IS A POPULAR SENTIMENT.

¶18. TO BE SURE, SUDANESE SECURITY AUTHORITIES, MINDFUL OF LIBYAN MISCHIEF, HAVE GENERALLY TRIED TO KEEP CLOSE TABS ON LIBYAN ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS IN AND NEAR KHARTOUM. THE RECENT ABOLITION OF VISAS FOR LIBYANS (AND SUBSEQUENTLY ALL ARABS) COMPLICATES THEIR JOB, THOUGH SECURITY OFFICERS AT THE AIRPORT REPORTEDLY ARE PAYING SPECIAL ATTENTION TO LIBYAN VISITORS WHEN THEY PASS THROUGH NORMAL IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS PROCEDURES. CYNICS RECKON THERE IS LITTLE LEFT TO SABOTAGE IN SUDAN. LACKLUSTER LIBYAN-BACKED REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES IN SUDAN, RECOGNIZED AS A "POLITICAL PARTY" BEFORE THE COUP, DISBANDED WITH THE ABOLITION OF PARTIES, AND, ACCORDING TO SEVERAL SUDANESE, HAVE REMAINED INACTIVE. LIBYANS APPEAR TO BE FOCUSING INSTEAD ON LINKING THEIR POPULAR ORGANIZATIONS WITH SUDAN'S LOCALLY-BASED, AND INCREASINGLY ACTIVE PEOPLES' COMMITTEES AND POPULAR DEFENSE FORCES. AS FOR LIBYAN TRANSGRESSIONS IN DARFUR, WHILE SOME SUDANESE PROFESS TO BE TROUBLED BY THE AFFRONT TO SUDAN'S SOVEREIGNTY, THE MAJORITY SEEM CONTENT TO TURN A BLIND EYE TO EVENTS IN A REMOTE AREA.

¶19. LIBYA'S MAIN ECONOMIC ATTRACTION IS CHEAP OIL BUT SUDAN HAS LITTLE OF VALUE TO OFFER IN RETURN. DEPRIVED OF REGULAR SUPPLIES FROM KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA, DUE TO NONPAYMENT AND RCC POLITICS, SUDAN RECENTLY HAS HAD TO RELY ALMOST COMPLETELY ON LIBYAN OIL. THE CURRENT DEAL FOR LIBYAN OIL REQUIRES SUDAN TO PAY ONLY FOR INTEREST ON THE PURCHASE WITH THE PRINCIPAL TO BE PAID IN KIND WITH FUTURE SUDANESE OIL PRODUCTION. DESPITE WELL-PUBLICIZED AGREEMENTS WITH LIBYA, SHIPMENTS OF LIBYAN OIL HAVE BEEN ERRATIC. LIBYA'S PROMISED 50,000 METRIC TONS OF OIL PER MONTH TO SADIOQ'S GOVERNMENT AND THE RCC HAS NOT ALWAYS ARRIVED. FOLLOWING THE MARCH 1990 INTEGRATION ACCORD, LIBYA PLEDGED TO DOUBLE ITS SUDANESE OIL SHIPMENTS TO 100,000 METRIC TONS FOR BOTH APRIL AND MAY.

¶20. SUDAN'S BALANCE OF TRADE WITH LIBYA HAS BEEN ENTIRELY NEGATIVE ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT FIGURES. FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1989, LIBYA RECEIVED NO SUDANESE EXPORTS WHILE SUDAN IMPORTED 269,712,000 POUNDS (USDOLS 22,500,000) OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS FROM LIBYA. LIBYA HAS FOCUSED INSTEAD ON OBTAINING POLITICAL DIVIDENDS FROM TRADE. THIS WAS DRAMATICALLY REFLECTED IN THE 1989 KHARTOUM TRADE FAIR WHEN LIBYA'S BOOTH WAS CONFINED TO ANTI-AMERICAN SLOGANS AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF ALLEGED CASUALTIES FROM U.S. BOMBING OF TRIPOLI. (THE U.S. PULLED OUT WHEN THE GOS FAILED TO ACT ON AMERICAN PROTESTS.) IN DECEMBER 1989, SUDAN AND LIBYA APPROVED A USDOLS 50 MILLION COMMERCIAL PROTOCOL PLEDGING THE EXPORT OF SUDANESE GOATS, OIL SEEDS, PERFUME AND TEXTILES IN RETURN FOR OIL, FERTILIZERS AND CEMENT. AS WITH THE EGYPTIAN PROTOCOL, THE ACCORD IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR ITS POLITICAL DIMENSIONS RATHER THAN AS A GUIDE TO ACTUAL TRADE. A BILATERAL PROTOCOL IN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION WAS SIGNED IN FEBRUARY 1990 AIMED AT LIBYAN BANKROLLING CEREAL AND MEAT PRODUCTION FACILITIES. LIBYAN AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE ALSO HAS MORE POLITICAL THAN ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE; A LIBYAN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT SCHEME IN DARFUR IS WIDELY VIEWED AS A FRONT FOR ARMS SMUGGLING AND OTHER NONAGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES.

¶21. SUDAN AND LIBYA RECENTLY RESURRECTED THE IDEA OF A JOINT INVESTMENT BANK CAPITALIZED AT USDOLS 50 MILLION AND HAVE DISCUSSED IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORT SERVICES BETWEEN THEIR COUNTRIES. AS IN THE CASE OF OIL SHIPMENTS HOWEVER, LIBYAN PROMISES OF ECONOMIC HELP FOR ECONOMIC PROJECTS HAVE HAD A HABIT OF NOT MATERIALIZING. LIBYA PROVIDES A MODEST NUMBER OF JOBS FOR SUDANESE--ABOUT 2000 SUDANESE RESIDE IN LIBYA BESIDES SEASONAL MIGRATION OF SUDANESE TRIBES FROM DARFUR INTO KUFRA. A SUDANESE ESTIMATED THAT 2000-3000 DARFUR TRIBESMEN WORK WITHOUT PERMITS IN KUFRA.

¶22. LIBYA, ONCE A BACKER OF THE SPLA, IS NOW SUDAN'S MOST DEPENDABLE MILITARY SUPPLIER. THE SUBSTANTIAL SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP EXISTS EITHER BASED ON SECRET PACTS AS ALLEGED BY THE SPLA OR, MORE LIKELY, BASED ON INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS CONCLUDED BY SADIOQ AL-MAHDI'S MINIONS AND SUBSEQUENTLY RENEWED BY THE RCC. A FORMAL MILITARY PROTOCOL SIGNED BY THE GOS SHORTLY AFTER PRESIDENT NIMEIRI'S OUSTER WAS NOT OPEN-ENDED AND REFERRED ONLY TO A SPECIFIC LIST OF ITEMS. BY WHATEVER RATIONALE, THE LIBYANS HAVE LOANED OR DONATED IN THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS MILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF MILITARY PROVISIONS RANGING FROM AMMUNITION TO MIG-23 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. DOLLAR FIGURES ARE DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE, BUT THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THIS AID HAS BEEN A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN PROPPING UP THE SUDANESE ARMY IN ITS CONFLICT WITH THE SPLA. SINCE THE COUP, LIBYA HAS DISPATCHED TWICE WEEKLY TO SUDAN AN IL-76 TRANSPORT PLANE LANDED WITH SUPPLIES, BELIEVED EXCLUSIVELY FOR MILITARY USE. IN ADDITION, LIBYA HAS PROVIDED TRAINING, ADVISORS AND PILOTS, THOUGH LIBYA'S DIRECT INVOLVEMENT WITH THE MILITARY IN SUDAN HAS BEEN DENIED BY THE GOS. LIBYAN MILITARY, HOWEVER, ARE PERIODICALLY SEEN AT KHARTOUM HOTELS AND MILITARY FACILITIES. LIBYA'S INVOLVEMENT IN BOMBING RAIDS WAS PROVEN WHEN THE SPLA PRODUCED A LIBYAN PILOT AFTER DOWNING A MIG AIRCRAFT IN ¶1989. THE GOS STILL DENIED IT. LIBYAN PILOTS SEEM TO OPERATE AUTONOMOUSLY, WITH THE TACIT BACKING OF THE

SUDANESE MILITARY BRASS.

SAUDI ARABIA

¶23. WHILE SHUNNING THE SPOTLIGHT, SAUDI ARABIA, MORE THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY, PLAYS A CRITICAL ECONOMIC ROLE IN BOLSTERING SUDAN THROUGH LARGE-SCALE REMITTANCE-PRODUCING EMPLOYMENT, DIRECT GOVERNMENT AID, TRADE AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT. WITH AN ESTIMATED 350,000 SUDANESE DOCUMENTED EXPATRIATE WORKERS (PLUS ANOTHER 150,000 OR SO WHO NEVER RETURNED FROM HAJ), SAUDI ARABIA PROVIDES THE LARGEST SHARE OF REMITTANCES. BECAUSE THE BULK OF REMITTANCES HAVE COME TO SUDAN THROUGH UNOFFICIAL CHANNELS, THEY HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT TO CALCULATE.

ACCORDING TO ONE STUDY IN 1985, TOTAL REMITTANCES AMOUNTED TO USDOLS 2.9 BILLION, ONE-THIRD OF SUDAN'S GNP. OFFICIAL EXPATRIATE REMITTANCES IN 1988 TOTALED USDOLS 445 MILLION WHICH CONSTITUTED 78 PERCENT OF SUDAN'S HARD CURRENCY BUDGET. SINCE THE COUP HOWEVER, NOT ONLY HAS OFFICIAL REMITTANCES DECLINED TO AN ANNUAL TARGET OF USDOLS 300 MILLION (AND PROBABLY MUCH LESS), BUT UNOFFICIAL REMITTANCES, PROVIDING MUCH NEEDED PRIVATE INVESTMENT, ALSO HAVE DRIED UP IN THE FACE OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION ZEAL OF THE RCC. EXPATRIATES HAVE PREFERRED TO KEEP THEIR SAVINGS IN FOREIGN ACCOUNTS WHICH THEIR FAMILIES USE WHEN THEY ARE ABLE TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE OF SUDAN.

¶24. WITH ITS RELATIVELY HIGH SALARIES, SAUDI ARABIA IS THE FAVORED DESTINATION FOR AMBITIOUS AND ENTERPRISING SUDANESE. THRONGS OF VISA APPLICANTS CAN ALWAYS BE SEEN OUTSIDE THE SAUDI EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM DURING WORKING HOURS. SUDANESE WORKERS IN SAUDI ARABIA RANGE FROM PROFESSIONALS (TWO-THIRDS OF SUDANESE DOCTORS ARE OVERSEAS) TO MANUAL LABORERS. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT HAS PROVIDED IRREGULAR DOSES OF AID, MOST RECENTLY RELEASING 207 MILLION RIYALS (USDOLS 55.2 MILLION) TO REBUILD THE ROAD FROM KHARTOUM TO PORT SUDAN. THE SAUDIS HAVE GENERALLY AVOIDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEY RECENTLY TURNED DOWN, FOR EXAMPLE, GOS REQUESTS FOR SMALL NAVAL CRAFT FOR ANTISMUGGLING PATROLS ON THE RED SEA. THEY REPORTEDLY FINANCED, HOWEVER, THE SUDANESE PURCHASE FROM CHINA IN 1989 OF 40 TANKS AND 40 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS (APC'S), ALONG WITH FIELD AND ANTI AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY AND SMALL ARMS. THE SAUDI MONETARY FUND AND SAUDI FUND FOR DEVELOPMENT HAVE FUNDED NUMEROUS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS INCLUDING ABOUT FIFTY THAT ARE ONGOING. REHABILITATION OF THE GEZIRA AGRICULTURAL SCHEME AND A NEW AIRPORT IN PORT SUDAN ARE EXAMPLES OF MAJOR PROJECTS UNDERWAY. ACCORDING TO 1988 FIGURES, SAUDI AGENCIES HAD OVER USDOLS 1.2 BILLION IN OUTSTANDING LOANS TO SUDAN, BY FAR THE LARGEST LOAN COMMITMENT OF ANY NATION. REPORTEDLY, SAUDI WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE AID HAS LANQUISHED RECENTLY BECAUSE OF SAUDI DISMAY WITH RCC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MISMANAGEMENT.

¶25. OFFICIAL TRADE FIGURES CONFIRM THAT SAUDI ARABIA IS SUDAN'S LARGEST TRADE PARTNER. FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1989, SUDANESE EXPORTS--LARGELY LIVESTOCK (CAMELS AND GOATS), SESAME SEEDS AND SORGHUM--TOTALLED 276,624,000 POUNDS (USDOLS 22,674,000) AND IMPORTS--PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT--CAME TO 316,627,000 POUNDS (USDOLS 25,953,000). SAUDIS HAVE ALSO BEEN IMPORTANT PRIVATE INVESTORS IN SUDAN, INCLUDING PRINCE MOHAMMAD AL FAISAL (FAISAL ISLAMIC BANK), SHEIKH MAHFOUZ SALEM BIN MAHFOUZ (SAUDI-SUDANESE BANK), SHEIKH ABDEL LATIF GHORAB (DALLAH AL-BARAKA GROUP), SHEIKH OMER BIN LADEN (BIN LADEN COMPANIES) AND IBRAHIM AL-AFFANDI. ALTHOUGH SAUDI INVESTORS HAVE BEEN ASSIDUOUSLY COURTED BY THE RCC PRIVATELY AND AT THE RECENT INVESTMENT CONFERENCE, BUSINESSMEN REPORT THAT SAUDIS AND OTHER ARAB INVESTORS HAVE EXHIBITED A MARKED RELUCTANCE TO RISK THEIR FUNDS IN SUDAN. SAUDI PRIVATE INVESTMENT SEEMS TO BE SHRINKING RATHER THAN EXPANDING.

¶26. SUDAN'S LINKS TO SAUDI ARABIA ARE BOTH STRENGTHENED AND WEAKENED BY ISLAMIC CONNECTIONS. ALL BUT THE MOST SECULAR OF SUDANESE MUSLIMS PARTICIPATE AT LEAST ONCE IN

THE HAJ, THE PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA. SAUDI ARABIA ALSO CONTRIBUTES SUBSTANTIALLY TO ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN SUDAN INCLUDING AN ISLAMIC INSTITUTE IN KHARTOUM. PARADOXICALLY, SUDAN'S RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES ARE AMONG THE ELEMENTS THAT MOST DISCONCERT THE SAUDIS. RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF THE PURIST WAHABI SECT IN SAUDI ARABIA FROWN ON MYSTICAL MUSLIM PRACTICES COMMON IN SUDAN INCLUDING VENERATION OF SAINTLY FOREFATHERS, CONSULTATIONS WITH LIVING FAKIS (HOLY MEN) AND MAGICAL (FORTUNE TELLING, HEALING) FORMS OF FOLK RELIGION. POLITICALLY, THE SAUDIS DISDAIN ISLAMIC COMPETITION ARISING FROM SUFI SECTS AND THE INDIGENOUS NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT. BECAUSE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM HAS OFTEN INCLUDED AN ANTI-SAUDI STRAIN, THEY REPORTEDLY ARE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH MILITANT PROCLIVITIES, INCLUDING IRANIAN SYMPATHIES, APPARENT IN SOME SUDANESE OFFICIALS. THIS ALSO REFLECTS LACK OF SAUDI ENTHUSIASM FOR SUPPORTING ANY ARAB COUNTRY WHICH ATTEMPTS TO FOLLOW A STRICTER FORM OF ISLAM THAN THAT OF THE KEEPER OF THE HOLY CITIES. SAUDIS ARE ALSO SAID TO BE DISTRESSED AT THE FUROR IN SUDAN OVER THE HUDUD, WHICH DRAWS UNWANTED ATTENTION TO SAUDI APPLICATION OF SHARIA LAW. SAUDIS, DISTINGUISHING THEIR HOMOGENOUS MUSLIM NATION FROM A MIXED RELIGIOUS SOCIETY LIKE SUDAN, WOULD PREFER THAT SUDAN COMPROMISE ON SHARIA TO PRODUCE PEACE, RELIGIOUS HARMONY AND STABILITY. SUDAN'S ASSOCIATIONS WITH RADICAL LIBYA ONLY AGGRAVATE SAUDI DISCOMFORT WITH SUDAN, A DISCOMFORT THAT HAS ALREADY DIMINISHED SAUDI ASSISTANCE FOR SUDAN.

IRAQ

¶27. THE EARLY LOVEFEST BETWEEN THE RCC AND SADDAM HUSSEIN, MUCH OF IT COUCHED IN SECRECY, SEEMS SOMETHING OF AN ANAMOLY, WHICH MAY EXPLAIN WHY IT HAS NOW COOLED SOMEWHAT. SADDAM, AFTER ALL, RULES A SECULAR STATE WARY OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS (AN IRAQI DISSIDENT BELONGING TO AL-DAWA WAS MURDERED IN 1988 BY THE IRAQIS IN THE LOBBY OF KHARTOUM'S HILTON HOTEL), WHILE THE RCC, BACKED BY THE NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT, HAS PURGED AND ARRESTED HUNDREDS OF SUDANESE SECULARISTS. VISITS BY RCC MEMBERS OMAR AL-BASHIR AND MOHAMMAD AL-KHALIFA, HOWEVER, WERE WARMLY RECEIVED BY SADDAM AND GOS APPEALS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE SPLA TOOK KURMUK, WERE GENEROUSLY REWARDED WITH TWO SOVIET AN-12 AIRCRAFT, AND SHIPMENTS OF AMMUNITION AND SMALL ARMS. A NUMBER OF THEORIES HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD BY SUDANESE TO EXPLAIN SADDAM'S FRIENDLINESS. CERTAINLY SADDAM, LIKE MUBARAK, DESPISED SADIO AL-MAHDI, WHO FLIRTED WITH THE IRANIANS, AND THUS HAD REASON TO WELCOME HIS REPLACEMENT. SADDAM ALSO MAY HAVE FELT AN AFFINITY TO A GOVERNMENT OF SOLDIERS, CERTAINLY MORE SO THAN TO THE FREEWHEELING DEMOCRACY THAT PRECEDED IT. FURTHERMORE, SADDAM, WITH VISIONS OF GRANDEUR AS A PAN-ARAB LEADER AND REELING FROM CRITICISM FOR HIS POLICIES IN LEBANON, MAY HAVE BEEN SUSCEPTIBLE TO GOS BLANDISHMENTS. FINALLY, SADDAM, PERHAPS GRATEFUL FOR THE HELP OF SUDANESE "VOLUNTEERS" (TENS OF THOUSANDS OF MANUAL LABORERS IN IRAQ ENLISTED OR WERE COERCED IN THE WAR EFFORT) IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND, BECAUSE OF HIS OWN EXPERIENCE, SYMPATHISED WITH A SUDANESE WAR LARGEY AGAINST NONARABS. ALL OF THE ABOVE WERE PROBABLY FACTORS.

¶28. SADDAM'S AMICABLE RELATIONS WITH THE RCC PUT IRAQ'S KEY INSTITUTION IN SUDAN, THE IRAQI BAATHIST PARTY, IN A PREDICAMENT. COMPOSED LARGELY OF SUDANESE STUDENTS WHO ONCE STUDIED IN BAGHDAD, THE BAATHIST PARTY, WHICH IS SMALL BUT INFLUENTIAL AMONG SUDANESE PROFESSIONALS, STAUNCHLY SUPPORTS SECULARIST RULE AND OPPOSES THE NIF. BAATHISTS ENJOYED SOMEWHAT OF A GRACE PERIOD FROM SECURITY OFFICIALS AFTER THE COUP WITH ARRESTS OF ONLY A FEW PARTY LEADERS. INCLINED TO JOIN THE COMMUNISTS AND OTHER SECULARISTS IN OPPOSITION TO THE RCC, PARTY MEMBERS WERE TORN BETWEEN LOYALTY TO IRAQ AND SECULARIST IDEOLOGY. IT THUS VACILLATED BEFORE JOINING OTHER PARTIES AND UNIONS AND SIGNING AN OPPOSITION CHARTER AGAINST THE RCC. THE UNCERTAINTY WAS EVIDENT AGAIN AT THE TIME OF THE DOCTORS STRIKE IN DECEMBER 1989, AS MANY BAATHISTS, ESPECIALLY IN LEGAL CIRCLES, WERE SAID TO BE

RELUCTANT TO GET INVOLVED. BAATHISTS, ALONG WITH OTHER LEFTISTS, WERE ARRESTED IN LARGE NUMBERS AFTER THE STRIKE. AROUND THE SAME TIME, IRAQ SEEMS TO HAVE JOINED OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES IN THEIR DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE GOS, AND STOPPED SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE. BAATHIST CHAIRMAN TAISEER MUTASSIR RECENTLY TOLD A FELLOW ATTORNEY THAT IRAQ PLANNED TO CUT ALL ITS AID TO SUDAN.

THE PENINSULAR STATES

¶29. FOLLOWING EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA, THE LARGEST NUMBER OF EXPATRIATE SUDANESE WORK AND RESIDE IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. ACCORDING TO ONE SUDANESE ESTIMATE, THERE ARE BETWEEN 50,000 AND 100,000 SUDANESE IN THE UAE. MOST ARE MIDDLE CLASS BUSINESSMEN, CIVIL SERVANTS, TEACHERS AND PROFESSIONALS. TWO CURRENT CABINET MINISTERS WERE WORKING IN ABU DHABI WHEN THEY WERE PICKED FOR THE CABINET. KAMAL HAMZA, EX-MAYOR OF DUBAI AND NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RULER'S DIWAN, HEADS A DISTINGUISHED SUDANESE COMMUNITY IN DUBAI. THIS EXPATRIATE PRESENCE HAS FOCUSED SOME UAE ATTENTION ON SUDAN. THE ABU DHABI FUND HAD COMMITTED USDOLS 239,580,000 TO SUDANESE PROJECTS THROUGH 1988. SHEIKH ZAYID CONTRIBUTED USDOLS 35 MILLION TO SUDAN AFTER GENERAL OMAR PAID A VISIT, AND THE UAE NAVY REPORTEDLY TRAINS SUDANESE OFFICERS. THERE ARE ALSO SAID TO BE A NUMBER OF SUDANESE IN THE POLICE FORCES OF THE VARIOUS EMIRATES. A RECENT VISITOR TO THE UAE, WHO MET A NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, REPORTED COINSIDERABLE DISMAY OVER SUDAN. SHEIKH SULTAN OF SHARJAH (WHO HAS DONATED CONSIDERABLE MONEY TO THE UNIVERSITY OF KHARTOUM INCLUDING SHARJAH HALL) BLUNTLY TOLD THE VISITOR THAT HE AND OTHER OFFICIALS INTENDED TO AVOID ASSISTANCE TO THE GOS UNTIL IT "SHAPED UP."

¶30. KUWAIT ALSO HAS ATTRACTED SUDANESE PROFESSIONALS, THOUGH IN LESS NUMBERS THAN THE UAE--ABOUT 20,000 TO 30,000. KUWAIT'S MAJOR INPUT IN SUDAN HAS BEEN THROUGH THE KUWAIT FUND WHICH HAS PROVIDED LARGE AMOUNTS OF AID FOR DEVELOPMENT, MOSTLY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL (E.G. KENANA SUGAR FACTORY, A MAJOR POULTRY FARM), PROJECTS. USDOLS 809,353,000 WAS COMMITTED THROUGH 1988, SECOND ONLY TO THE SAUDIS. KUWAIT HAS UNTIL RECENTLY SUPPLIED OIL. SUDANESE OFFICIALS REPORT THAT KUWAITI INTEREST IN SUDAN IS ALSO DECLINING. ECHOING THEIR ARAB COLLEAGUES, KUWAITIS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE GOS IS ISOLATING ITSELF INTERNATIONALLY AND MAKING LITTLE PROGRESS IN ECONOMIC REFORM.

¶31. ABOUT FOUR TO SIX THOUSAND SUDANESE, MOSTLY TEACHERS, WORK IN OMAN AND NORTH YEMEN. THESE COUNTRIES HAVE PROVIDED LITTLE DIRECT ASSISTANCE, THOUGH OMAN MADE A SMALL CONTRIBUTION AFTER A VISIT BY OMAR AL-BASHIR. THE SUDANESE HAVE HAD A LENGTHY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE YEMENIS--MANY ATTENDED SCHOOL IN KHARTOUM, OTHERS WORKED AS PEDDLERS. INTERESTINGLY, SUDANESE TEND TO PICK YEMENIS, WHO ARE PERCEIVED AS HONEST AND UNPRETENTIOUS, AS ARABS WITH WHOM THEY ARE MOST COMFORTABLE. QATAR, ANOTHER DISPLEASED ARAB STATE, REFUSED GENERAL OMAR'S PLEA FOR AID AND REPORTEDLY WANTS TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF SUDANESE EMPLOYED IN QATAR. ROUNDING OUT THE PENINSULAR STATES, SUDAN HAS LITTLE COMMERCIAL AND NO DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN BAHRAIN OR ADEN.

PERIPHERY STATES

¶32. SUDAN'S MODEST RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE REMAINING ARAB STATES, PERCEIVED AS DISTANT AND UNLIKELY DONORS, RARELY CONCERN THE GOS. EXCEPT FOR A COTERIE OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT ALUMNI NOW IN THEIR 40'S, FEW SUDANESE HAVE VENTURED TO THE LEVANT. LEBANON IS CITED IN CONVERSATION ONLY AS A WARNING OF WHAT DECENTRALIZED LOYALTIES AND INTOLERANCE MIGHT PRODUCE IN SUDAN. THE ARAB BAR ASSOCIATION'S ANNUAL MEETING IN 1989 IN DAMASCUS WAS THE FIRST VISIT TO SYRIA BY MEMBERS OF THE SUDANESE DELEGATION. SYRIA GIVES NO AID TO SUDAN, THOUGH RELIEF ASSISTANCE GIVEN IN 1988 IS DRAWING ATTENTION AS IT IS THE BASIS FOR A MISAPPROPRIATION AND CORRUPTION CASE AGAINST FORMER STATE COUNCIL MEMBER IDRIS AL-BANNA.

JORDAN HAS DONATED SOME MEDICINE AND SENDS A ROTATING MEDICAL TEAM TO WORK IN DARFUR. THE "PALESTINE AMBASSADOR" ACTIVELY BUT NOT TOO SUCCESSFULLY SEEKS TO SPARK SUDANESE INTEREST IN THE INTIFADA. HE HAS BEEN GIVEN PERMISSION TO CONSTRUCT A PALESTINE UNIVERSITY IN KHARTOUM. YASSIR ARAFAT'S OCCASIONAL VISITS ATTRACT LITTLE ATTENTION.

¶33. SUDAN ALSO HAS FEW TRADE OR OTHER LINKS WITH THE MAHGREG STATES. MOROCCAN LINKS, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE CONFINED TO 60 STUDENTS STUDYING IN MOROCCO AND A PRIVATE BANK'S FINANCING OF AN AGRICULTURE PROJECT. NONE OF THE DIPLOMATS FROM THE MAGHREG SEEM TO PAY MUCH ATTENTION TO LOCAL AFFAIRS. THE SOMALI EMBASSYS ONLY APPARENT FUNCTION IN SUDAN IS TO ISSUE REFUGEE DOCUMENTS TO ETHIOPIAN REBELS. MANY SUDANESE ARE NOT EVEN AWARE OF DJIBOUTI OR MAURITANIA, NEITHER OF WHICH HAVE AN EMBASSY IN KHARTOUM.

¶34. COMMENT. SUDAN DELIGHTS IN TRUMPETING ITS ROLE AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES. THIS COMMENDABLE THOUGH UNATTAINED IDEAL OVERLOOKS A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM--SUDAN'S BRIDGES TO BOTH ARABS AND AFRICANS ARE IN DISREPAIR. IRONICALLY WHILE ARAB RELATIONS WITH THE RCC HAVE GRADUALLY WORSENED UNTIL THEY HAVE RETURNED TO, OR EVEN BECOME WORSE THAN, THEIR PRE-COUP STATUS, GENERAL OMAR HAS MANAGED, DESPITE CONTINUING CONFLICT WITH THE SPLA AND ALLEGATIONS OF NIF INFLUENCE, TO REPAIR RELATIONS WITH SOME OF HIS AFRICAN NEIGHBORS INCLUDING KENYA, ZAIRE, AND THE C.A.R., DAMAGED BY SADIQ.

¶35. COMMENT CONTINUED. WHILE THE SPECTER OF PAN-ARABISM WHICH LOOMS IN ANY DISCUSSION OF AN ARAB CONSENSUS IS REVILED BY SOUTHERN SUDANESE, BROAD ARAB COLLABORATION TODAY,interestingly enough, is not inimical to southern interests or to those of the U.S. With the regrettable exception of Libya, Arab nations with connections to Sudan want peace, stability and economic reform in Sudan. They recognize the necessity of, and their leaders have encouraged, compromise on sharia, adjustment of policies to broaden gos political appeal, and cooperation with the IMF for real economic reform. Mending its Arab bridges may well prove a key to improving Sudan's fortunes.

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